Armenia-Turkey protocols

By Marina Ohanjanyan project assistant AMS/ European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity

The year that was filled with cautious talks on different levels between the two governments saw some controversy when in April the two sides announced they had agreed on a protocol on normalising relations, yet refused to make it public. Much confusion arose in Turkey, Armenia, the Armenian Diaspora communities and Azerbaijan concerning the question whether or not preconditions had been put to normalising the relations.

 

The Armenian authorities were doing their best to pacify Armenian communities in and outside of Armenia, assuring them no preconditions had been put forward. However, Turkish PM Erdogan had a number of public addresses in which he stressed that Turkey would not open its border with Armenia until the conflict between the latter and Azerbaijan over the break-away region of Nagorno-Karabakh is solved in the interest of Azerbaijan. In fact, Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1994 precisely in a gesture of solidarity with its close ally, Azerbaijan.

 

The announcement of the protocols was followed by some major developments in Armenian politics. Armenian Revolutionary Federation–Dashnaktutiun, a governing coalition partner at the time decided to leave the coalition in protest against the rapprochement with Turkey, and became the most active and vigorous opponent of the protocols. This also mirrored the attitude of the Armenian Diaspora, who saw the rapprochement as a threat to what they consider their historic rights to retribution of their ancestors who were either forced to flee Turkey or become victims of the Ottoman massacres of Armenians widely referred to as genocide. In fact, another controversial point in the protocols concerned the establishment of a historic commission of Turkish, Armenian and other representatives, that would be tasked with looking into the said massacres. However, at this point the Armenian authorities seem to have agreed to the establishment of such a commission, under loud protests of Armenian Diaspora communities around the world.

 

In the beginning of October, in an attempt to placate those communities, President Sarkissian embarked on a tour of the largest hubs of Armenian communities in the world, including Paris, Los Angeles, Beirut and Rostov-on-Don (Russia). However, he was met with angry protests as the visits were considered simply a symbolic gesture and not as opportunities for substantial debates on the issue.

 

Another interesting question is the role of Russia. The latter has largely steered clear of interfering in the process so far. However, some argue that a normalisation of relations between Armenia and Turkey will diminish Russia’s role in the region as Armenia’s biggest ally and counterweight to the Turkish-Azeri alliance. The move could thus bring about major geopolitical changes in the region. However, some Armenian experts also argue that a total normalisation between Armenia and Turkey will not come about until Turkey recognises the above-mentioned Ottoman massacres of Armenians as genocide. As this does not seem likely anytime soon, the relations will remain cautious, and the friendship limited, leaving enough space for Russia as an active actor in the region.

 

On October 10th the two countries’ Presidents finally signed the protocols. The procedure, however, did not take place without hick-ups. In fact, the ceremony in Zurich was delayed by three hours when Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nambaldian objected to a statement by his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu, that was due to be read at the ceremony. In the end, neither foreign minister read out any statements in a compromise that was arranged by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

 

The Protocols are currently awaiting ratification in both countries’ parliaments before they can be made official. As in Armenia the opposition to the protocols – although very much present in the streets – is marginalised in decision-making bodies, it seems reasonable to assume that the Armenian parliament will, indeed, ratify the protocols. The big question, however, is whether or not the Turkish parliament will do so. 

 

Turkey’s incentive to show its goodwill to the EU and the US and solve a long-standing regional issue is undoubtedly large. The results of Turkey’s policy are already clear, as in EU’s otherwise critical report on Turkey’s progress, much praise is given to the country’s stabilising role in the Caucasus.

 

However, is the incentive to show goodwill towards the West large enough to alienate Turkey’s equally long-standing and very close ally Azerbaijan? Doubt still exists concerning the presence of preconditions to normalising the ties, as Nagorno-Karabakh does not seem to feature in the protocols, while on the other hand, PM Erdogan keeps reassuring Azerbaijan that it will not be left alone. More recently, on October 27th, Foreign Minister Davutoglu reiterated Turkey’s position, that its parliament will not ratify the normalization agreements with Armenia unless international efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict yield a breakthrough.

 

Even besides the friendship and cultural closeness of Turkey and Azerbaijan – epitomised by the ‘one nation-two states’ slogan – Azerbaijan has much more to offer in terms of energy geo-politics than Armenia. If at any point Turkey is forced to choose between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the choice doesn’t seem difficult.